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1STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Marjorie Krambule appeals from the district court’s August 2016 order revoking her
withheld judgment and continuing her on probation.  She contends the order must be vacated
because the January 2015 judgment it purportedly revokes was void, as it was entered while she
was proceeding pro se and had not waived her right to counsel.  Alternatively, she contends there
is a structural defect in this case, requiring automatic reversal of her conviction.
Ms. Krambule submits this Reply Brief to respond to the State’s argument that this Court
lacks jurisdiction to consider the issues raised in this appeal.  This Court has jurisdiction to
consider the validity of the district court’s order revoking Ms. Krambule’s withheld judgment
because, if the withheld judgment was void, there was nothing for the district court to revoke,
and  the  order  purportedly  revoking  the  withheld  judgment  had  no  legal  effect.   Ms.  Krambule
also responds to the State’s argument that she validly waived her right to counsel, which is flatly
contradicted by the record.  The district court did not provide Ms. Krambule with any warnings
about proceeding pro se, as required by Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975), and in fact
expressed concern about Ms. Krambule’s emotional state and the voluntariness of her decision to
plead guilty at an earlier stage of these proceedings.  Ms. Krambule must be allowed to proceed
anew in the district court with the assistance of an attorney. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 807 (“The
Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments of our Constitution guarantee that a person brought to trial in
any state or federal court must be afforded the right to the assistance of counsel before he can be
validly convicted and punished by imprisonment.”)
2Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Krambule included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in her Appellant’s
Brief.  (Appellant’s Br., pp.2-7.)  She relies on and incorporates that statement herein.
3ISSUES
1. Should this Court vacate the August 2016 order revoking Ms. Krambule’s withheld
judgment because the January 2015 judgment it purportedly revokes was entered while
Ms. Krambule was proceeding pro se and had not waived her right to counsel, and was
thus void?
2. Alternatively, should this Court vacate Ms. Krambule’s conviction for accessory to
felony possession of a controlled substance because she was allowed to change her plea
from “not guilty” to “guilty” and was sentenced without being represented by counsel,
and without waiving her right to counsel, which is a structural defect requiring automatic
reversal?
4ARGUMENT
I.
This Court Should Vacate The August 2016 Order Revoking Ms. Krambule’s Withheld
Judgment Because The January 2015 Judgment It Purportedly Revokes Was Entered While
Ms. Krambule Was Proceeding Pro Se And Had Not Waived Her Right To Counsel, And Was
Thus Void
In its Respondent’s Brief, the State contends this appeal must be dismissed because
Ms.  Krambule’s  notice  of  appeal  was  timely  only  from  the  district  court’s  order  revoking  her
withheld judgment, and this Court thus lacks jurisdiction to consider the validity of the withheld
judgment.  (Respondent’s Br., pp.5-8.)  The State is incorrect.  The district court purported to
revoke a judgment that was void. See State v. Farfan-Galvan, 161 Idaho 610, __ 389 P.3d 155,
160 (2016) (deeming significant the holding in Burgett v. Texas, 389 U.S. 109, 114 (1967) that
“a judgment is void unless the defendant had a lawyer or waived that right”).  Where a judgment
is void, it is “[o]f no legal effect.”  BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).  Thus, in August
2016, when the district court attempted to revoke the January 2015 withheld judgment, there was
nothing to revoke.
The State cites multiple cases for the proposition that where a notice of appeal is timely
only from an order revoking probation, the issues on appeal are confined to the order revoking
probation, and the appellant cannot challenge the underlying judgment.  (Respondent’s Br., p.6.)
None of the cases cited by the State are analogous to this case, where Ms. Krambule contends the
underlying judgment was void.  Ms. Krambule is not asking this Court to review whether the
underlying sentence was reasonable, as the appellant was in State v. Dryden, 105 Idaho 848, 852
(Ct. App. 1983).  The Court of Appeals correctly stated in Dryden that because the appellant did
not appeal when the sentences were initially pronounced, he could not challenge their
reasonableness when appealing from an order revoking probation. Id.  Nor  is  Ms.  Krambule
5arguing that there was a constitutional defect in the underlying sentence, as the appellants were
in State v. Jensen, 138 Idaho 941, 944 (Ct. App. 2003) (attempting to challenge underlying
sentence on double jeopardy grounds), and State v. Tucker, 103 Idaho 885, 887-88 (Ct. App.
1982) (attempting to challenge underlying sentence as a violation of due process).  Instead,
Ms. Krambule contends the January 2015 withheld judgment was void.  This Court has
jurisdiction to consider the validity of a withheld judgment in an appeal from an order
purportedly revoking that withheld judgment where the appellant alleges the judgment was void.
II.
Alternatively, This Court Should Vacate Ms. Krambule’s Conviction For Accessory To Felony
Possession Of A Controlled Substance Because She Was Allowed To Change Her Plea From
“Not Guilty” To “Guilty” And Was Sentenced Without Being Represented By Counsel, And
Without Waiving Her Right To Counsel, Which Is A Structural Defect Requiring Automatic
Reversal
Ms. Krambule argued in her Appellant’s Brief that her conviction should be vacated
because it is clear from the record that she was denied her constitutional right to counsel in the
proceedings leading up to the entry of the withheld judgment in January 2015, and she is entitled
to relief whether the error is viewed as structural error or fundamental error.  (Appellant’s
Br., pp.11-13.)  The State argues in its Respondent’s Brief that “[a] review of the totality of the
circumstances in this case reveals that Krambule knowingly and voluntarily waived her right to
counsel and therefore has failed to demonstrate fundamental error.”  (Respondent’s Br., p.9.)
Nothing could be further from the truth.
When, represented by counsel, Ms. Krambule first changed her plea from “not guilty” to
“guilty,” she expressed, in the district court’s words, “a lot of emotion and a lot of reluctance.”
(Mot.  to  Aug.,  Ex.  A at  3:15-40.)   In  fact,  the  district  court  characterized  the  plea  colloquy as
“probably the most difficulty colloquy I’ve had with respect to a change of plea since I’ve been
6on the bench.”  (Mot.  to Aug.,  Ex. A at  28:20-32.)   The district  court  granted Ms. Krambule’s
motion to withdraw her guilty plea, recognizing she believed she had no other choice but to
plead guilty.  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. A at 32:30-33:10.)  However, when the district court accepted
Ms. Krambule’s second guilty plea, when she was not represented by counsel, the district court
did not engage in any colloquy with Ms. Krambule, and instead accepted her guilty plea “based
upon the colloquy we had . . . a month of two ago.”  (Mot. to Aug. Ex. C at 5:14-30, 7:00-05.)
The district court then proceeded directly to sentencing, denying Ms. Krambule any chance to
hire an attorney (since one presumably was not going to be appointed for her) or move to
withdraw her plea (if she had known how to make such a motion).
In  addition,  it  is  clear  from the  record  that  Ms.  Krambule  wanted  to  be  represented  by
counsel.  At the hearing on her attorney’s motion to withdraw, her attorney told the district court,
“I think my client would like to get alternative legal counsel, but how she’ll go about that, I don’t
know.”  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 11:00-15.)  After granting her attorney’s motion to withdraw, the
district court told Ms. Krambule she was “free if [she] would like to talk to [the prosecutor].”
(Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 17:01-18:36.)  Ms. Krambule asked if she could “get in more trouble for
doing  that”  and  if  she  would  “still  be  able  to  .  .  .  hire  another  lawyer”  and  the  district  court
answered, “Oh, absolutely, yes,” and said he could not imagine her getting in any trouble for
talking to the prosecutor about this case.  (Mot. to Aug., Ex. B at 17:01-18:36.)  The district court
never told Ms. Krambule she might be eligible to be represented by a public defender, and never
warned her of the risks of proceeding pro se.
A defendant’s waiver of the right to counsel must be knowing, intelligent and voluntary.
See State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 53, 64 (2003).  Ms. Krambule did not express a desire to
proceed pro se,  but was simply left  unrepresented after the district  court  granted her attorney’s
7motion to withdraw.  There is no indication that Ms. Krambule appreciated the dangers and
disadvantages of proceeding pro se, and she had not demonstrated any ability to file motions or
perform legal research on her behalf. Compare with State v. Jackson, 140 Idaho 636, 641
(Ct. App. 2014) (concluding record was insufficient to demonstrate a valid waiver of the right to
counsel at trial even though defendant had “demonstrated some ability to file motions and
perform legal research”).  In no way did Ms. Krambule make a choice to represent herself “with
eyes open,” as the United States Supreme Court has required. See Faretta, 422 U.S. at 835.
Instead, Ms. Krambule, a woman with known mental health issues, entered into a plea agreement
she had previously disavowed, pleading guilty to a felony she denied committing, while
unrepresented by counsel, and having expressed a desire to be represented by an attorney.
Ms. Krambule’s conviction must be vacated.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in her Appellant’s Brief,
Ms. Krambule respectfully requests that this Court vacate the district court’s order revoking her
withheld  judgment,  vacate  her  conviction,  and  remand  this  case  to  the  district  court  with
instructions to allow Ms. Krambule to withdraw her guilty plea, and proceed with the assistance
of counsel.
DATED this 26th day of July, 2017.
_____________/s/___________________
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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